A ccording to Pensions & Investments magazine, the top 1,000 defined benefit plans had assets of $5.4 trillion as of September 30, 2007 , with approximately 25% of these assets devoted to U.S. fixed-income products. 1 This allocation, about $1.4 trillion, is too large to ignoreeven in the emerging manager space. The domestic fixed-income allocation is second only to domestic equities. The Chicago Board Options Exchange's (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX) shows the market's expectation of 30-day volatility. From July 2007 and July 2008 the range was between 15 and 32. Values greater than 30 are generally associated with a large amount of volatility. Given this recent equity volatility rollercoaster, some plans may be looking to increase their exposure to fixedincome. Liability driven investing (LDI) has become more important for a growing number of plans.
Historically, asset management firms with limited assets under management (AUM) were excluded from the request for proposal (RFP) process because the threshold amount required for the firm as well as the product was too high. Emerging managers face challenges such as limited track record, low AUM, and limited personnel and financial resources when compared to their larger counterparts. Emerging manager research attempts to determine whether any of these aforementioned limitations reduce the chances of emerging manager outperformance.
The emerging manager sub-industry evolved from some pension funds seeking to hire minority-and women-owned money management firms. These funds wanted their asset managers to be reflective of its constituency. As many plans moved away from minority-and women-owned preferences, the emerging manager sub-industry was formed because it did not favor one group over another. The hiring of emerging firms is a way that plan sponsors can hire managers whose interests are aligned with their beneficiaries. This notion has further developed into requirements that emerging managers be at least 51% employee-owned. The theory here is that employee-owned firms minimize agency costs as prescribed by Jensen and Meckling [1976] .
There is no hard-and-fast rule as to what maximum AUM constitute an emerging manager. However, most plans and research use $2 billion and under. We subsequently use this $2 billion as our definition.
To date, virtually all the research concerning emerging managers has focused on equities and the hedge fund industry. Krum [1995] and Krum [2007] exclusively focus on equities. He finds that emerging equity managers outperform their larger counterparts. Aggarwal and Jorion [2008] A u t h o r D r a f t F o r R e v i e w O n l y negatively correlated with performance, and significantly so. Allen [2007] finds that smaller small-cap equity managers and high-yield managers outperform larger managers.
This article attempts to address two issues that have yet to be addressed by the current body of research. First, we exclusively analyze fixed-income products. Many plan sponsors have ignored the emerging manager fixedincome space. Again, with approximately 25% of total assets allocated to fixed income, the search for outpeformance should not exclude such a large and important asset class. Secondly, the research that has been published regarding emerging manager firms uses AUM as the variable of interest. We instead use the age of a firm as the primary variable.
Recall that the emerging firm definition focuses on AUM. The assumption of plan sponsors who hire emerging managers is probably that these firms are relatively newly formed and hungry to outperform. However, this is not always the case. A firm can qualify as emerging even though it has been in existence for many years-perhaps even a couple of decades. How can a firm continue for 20 years or more and still be considered emerging? Several reasons come to mind. A firm could have begun as a wealth management firm with only individual clients. A firm's assets can also grow slowly because the principals' primary focus is not marketing. These reasons would not necessarily be motivation for institutional clients to shy away from such firms. But, a firm could also have a long tenure and be classified as emerging with negative ramifications. Firm instability with respect to ownership and personnel can be reasons that older firms cannot continue to grow assets. And of course, poor performance can hinder growth. In light of these reasons, we wanted to evaluate performance not based on AUM but rather age. The Aggarwal and Jorion [2008] article is one of the first if not the first to use age as the targeted variable.
This article focuses on emerging managers with respect to age rather than size. The terms "emerging" and "younger" managers are used synonymously.
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

Sample Construction
There are several third-party vendors that collect and distribute data on asset management performance for separate accounts. We use Informa Investment Solutions (IIS). IIS is a global database of approximately 2,000 investment managers that represent more than 11,000 domestic, global, and international investment products. We use monthly data starting in January 1985. We chose this date because it is the first year for which there is a non trivial number of inception dates of new domestic fixed-income firms.
2
There is a total of 317 fixed-income firms with 958 products in our initial sample. Exhibit 1 presents sample construction statistics. We began our analysis using three products: core, core plus, and high-yield. A problem with using commercially available databases is backfill bias. Backfill bias occurs when firms populate a database with returns only after they have incubated the product for a number of years and the product exhibits good returns. If there exists a backfill bias, returns can be overstated. Research has shown the backfill bias to be significant. In order to address the backfill bias, we remove products that did not begin reporting performance within one year of the founding date of the firm. This methodology is employed by Aggarwal and Jorion [2008] and is the only way to mitigate the backfill issue without personally constructing databases throughout time. Other studies address the backfill issue by arbitrarily dropping the first year or two of performance data. This methodology is unacceptable when the objective is to analyze emerging managers. The IIS database includes both active and inactive portfolios. Firms have the option of removing performance history altogether if they so choose. There is no way to determine how many firms exercise this option. This reduces survivorship bias by the greatest extent possible.
Our backfill bias elimination methodology also eliminated core plus from our sample due to low numbers (six firms). Core plus tends to be a product offered later in a firm's life. We believe our analysis is not negatively impacted by this elimination given that core plus is a derivative product of core and high yield. Because RFPs often screen for emerging firms with at least 51% employee ownership, we eliminate all firms that are majority-owned by outsiders. This reduces the number to 82 firms with 152 products. From these numbers, we eliminate core fixed-income and high-yield products with potential backfill biases as well as mislabeled products.
3 Our final sample includes 54 firms. Core fixed-income accounts for 37, and 17 are high-yield. No firm had both core fixedincome and high-yield products in our sample.
A u t h o r D r a f t F o r R e v i e w O n l y
Results
Exhibit 2 graphically depicts the number of new core fixed-income and high-yield firms that were formed and were majority-employee-owned from January 1985 to December 2006. Most of the firms were formed prior to 2000. It is our hypothesis that higher barriers to entry were set in place in the form of more RFPs requiring minimum AUM.
One major drawback for plan sponsors and their investment consultants in hiring emerging firms is the potential for business risk. That is, potential investors are concerned that the firm will not or cannot continue as a going entity because of its small size and limited time in business. Exhibit 3 addresses this concern. Of the 88 firms that have core, core plus, and high-yield fixed-income product and were founded since 1985 with majority employee ownership, 65 are still active firms. We investigate why 26% of these firms are inactive. We utilize the Securities and Exchange Commission's website as well as company websites to determine information about inactive firms. Some firms are still very much in business but no longer offer the product specified. Another group grew such that it probably does not populate databases anymore.
Of these 23 firms that have inactive products, only three do not exist today. We know of three other fixedincome firms that are no longer in business that are not included in the IIS database. So, out of 88 firms, only six no longer have their doors open. This percentage (6.8%) is a strong indication that the likelihood is low that a manager who has been funded will go out of business.
Evidence of staying power is good news to potential investors. However, what type of performance can younger managers deliver? Exhibits 4 and 5 present performance figures by year for the fixed-income firms on a gross and excess return basis, respectively. Year 1 consists of a portfolio of firms with performance data from their first through 12th month of existence. Year 2 measures firms with returns from months 13 to 24, and so on. These monthly returns are converted to annual returns. There are 27 core fixed-income firms with at least a 10-year track record and 11 for high-yield. The number of firms decreases because of attrition and based on when the firm began performance. For example, if a firm began reporting performance in July 2005, there would be less than two years' worth of returns. 
A u t h o r D r a f t F o r R e v i e w O n l y
We show that younger firms exhibit higher gross returns than older firms in both core and high-yield. The results are significant both economically and statistically. Similar to Aggarwal and Jorion [2008] , we find that firstyear performance figures are substantially higher than for any other year. Also, the first five years of gross performance are higher than the second five years. During the first five years for core fixed-income, average performance is 7.7% versus 6.6% during the following five years. For high-yield, average performance is 11.9% for the first five years versus 8.9% during the following five years.
The Sharpe ratio calculates returns adjusted for total risk. It is defined as:
(1) where = average monthly returns r f = risk-free rate σ i = standard deviation of the monthly returns The Sortino ratio is sometimes the preferred riskadjusted ratio measurement in investment management because the Sharpe ratio uses total risk rather than downside risk. The Sortino ratio is defined as: 
E X H I B I T 2 Pattern of Inception and Growth for Asset Management Firms with Core Fixed-income and High-yield Products
We present the number of new fixed-income core and high-yield firms that were formed and majority employee owned within the calendar years . The cumulative number of firms is denoted by the line graph. Panel A represents core fixed-income firms and Panel B represents high-yield firms. Firms need not be exclusively fixed-income to be included. The Sharpe and Sortino ratios present results that are generally more favorable for younger firms.
A u t h o r D r a f t F o r R
IS AGE JUST A NUMBER: THE PERFORMANCE OF EMERGING FIXED-INCOME MANAGERS SPRING 2009
E X H I B I T 4 Fixed-income Portfolio Gross Returns Grouped by Existence
This exhibit presents gross performance figures by year for the fixed-income products. Year 1 consists of a portfolio of firms with performance data from their first through 12th month of existence. Year 2 measures firms with returns from months 13 to 24, and so on. These monthly returns are converted to annual returns as is the standard deviation. Means difference tests are used to test the hypothesis of equal returns for the first five years versus the second five-year period. Number of funds enumerates at the beginning of each year. The Sharpe and Sortino ratios measure riskadjusted returns.
p value (t statistic) for mean difference test for equal returns for first five years versus second five years: 0.017 (2.419). p value (t statistic) for mean difference test for equal returns for first five years versus second five years: 0.051 (1.969).
A u t h o r D r a f t F o r R e v i e w O n l y
The excess gross return data in Exhibit 5 lend more evidence that performance is better when the firm is younger. The core fixed-income is relative to the Lehman U.S. Aggregate Index and the high-yield is relative to the Lehman U.S. High-yield Credit Index. The Lehman U.S.
Aggregate Index represents securities that are SECregistered, taxable, and dollar denominated with components for investment grade, government and corporate securities, mortgage pass-through securities, and assetbacked securities. 
E X H I B I T 5 Fixed-income Portfolio Gross Excess Returns Grouped by Existence
This exhibit presents annual excess gross performance figures by year for the fixed-income products. Core fixed-income is relative to the Lehman U.S. Aggregate Index and high-yield is relative to the Lehman U.S. High-yield Credit. Year 1 consists of a portfolio of firms with performance data from their first through 12th month of existence. Year 2 measures firms with returns from months 13 to 24, and so on. These monthly returns are converted to annual returns, as is the standard deviation. Means difference tests are used to test the hypothesis of equal returns for the first five years versus the second five-year period. Number of funds enumerates at the beginning of each year. 
p value (t statistic) for mean difference test for equal excess returns for first five years versus second five years: 0.036 (2.121). p value (t statistic) for mean difference test for equal excess returns for first five years versus second five years: 0.170 (1.381).
A u t h o r D r a f t F o r
E X H I B I T 6 Manager of Manager Portfolio of Fixed-income Firms 10 Years of Age and Younger
A portfolio is constructed of fixed-income firms that are newly founded each year. A firm is added in the month in which it commences performance data. The portfolio holds onto the firm until it reaches 10 years old. Then that firm is sold out of the portfolio. Firms drop out and are picked up as time advances.
A u t h o r D r a f t F o r R e v i e w O n l y
The Lehman High-yield Index covers the universe of fixed-rate, non-investment-grade debt.
Younger core fixed-income firms outperform on a relative basis when compared to older firms. The average of the first five years of excess return is 30 basis points versus seven for the older ones. For high-yield the results are more pronounced. The younger firms average 209 basis points of outperformance versus 65 for the older firms. The high-yield results suggest significant outperformance net of fees for younger managers and slight outperformance for older ones.
Some plan sponsors utilize manager of manager (MoM) programs to invest in emerging asset management firms. These plans realize the benefits of investing with emerging managers; however, they lack the manpower internally to properly administer such a program. 
E X H I B I T 7 Quartile Rankings
Quartile rankings are a measure of how well a firm's product performed against all other similar funds tracked by the Informa Investment Solutions (IIS) database. Funds in the top 25% are assigned to the 1st quartile; the next 25% are assigned the median ranking, and so forth. Only active firms are included by IIS.
A u t h o r D r a f t F o r R e v i e w O n l y
The MoM forms a portfolio of emerging managers based on criteria set by the plan. Borrowing from the MoM concept, we create a portfolio of newly formed fixedincome managers and present these results in Exhibit 6. The portfolio includes all newly formed fixed-income firms (products) in the month that returns are first reported. The firm (product) remains in the portfolio until it reaches 10 years (120 months) worth of return history. At that point the firm (product) is "sold" out of the portfolio. The portfolio is compared to its respective benchmark. Risk metrics are also calculated.
The core fixed-income portfolio exhibits similar risk characteristics to that of the Lehman U.S. Aggregate Index, as expected. However, over a long-term period (20 years), the MoM portfolio yields 117 basis points of alpha. The annual return over the same period is 8.28%, which places the performance in the first quartile of all core fixed-income managers in the IIS database.
4 Shorter term, the three-, five-, and 10-year performance is in the second quartile. The one-year performance for the MoM portfolio is 2 basis points below the median. Sharpe and Sortino ratios are positive except for the three-and fiveyear periods.
The high-yield MoM portfolio performed in the second quartile for the one-, five-, and 10-year periods. Its performance was in the third quartile for the three-year period. However, the 20-year performance exhibit places the MoM portfolio in the highest 5% of all portfolios at 10.68%. All Sharpe and Sortino ratios are positive except for the one-year exhibits. Results from the core fixedincome and high-yield MoM portfolios are consistent with Allen [2007] , who suggests that core fixed-income firms with larger assets under management outperform their smaller rivals, but high-yield managers with smaller assets under management perform better than their larger competitors. Allen uses AUM and we use age. In more inefficient, less liquid markets, younger emerging highyield managers can add value.
Exhibit 7 shows the quartile rankings for the entire universe of core fixed-income and high-yield products in the database. These are the rankings that are used for comparison in Exhibit 6.
RELEVANCE TO INVESTMENT COMMUNITY
While recent studies have analyzed various aspects of emerging manager performance, none has focused on emerging fixed-income managers. We show that there is potential for alpha by investing in emerging fixed-income firms. Adding younger, emerging fixed-income managers can enhance institutional portfolios by diversification of managers across firm age and size.
We make several relevant points to the investment community. First, we examine how emerging fixedincome firms perform over time and how the age of the firm is important. Prior research primarily focuses on the size of hedge funds and equity managers. Second, we add to emerging manager literature by exclusively focusing on fixed-income-a very important asset class for institutional investors. We also show that the fear plan sponsors have of younger, emerging managers going out of business after being funded is not supported by the data. Importantly, we find statistically significant evidence that younger managers outperform during the first five years of existence.
We are able to control for both backfill bias and survivorship bias. However, our study is dependent on selfreported data. All asset management firms do not populate all databases. Thus, regardless of the database used, some firms will be excluded. Nonetheless, this current study provides strong evidence in favor of emerging fixedincome firms.
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1 Pensions and Investments publishes statistics on characteristics of various aspects of the asset management industry. In its January 21, 2008 publication, "Pensions and Investments 1000: The Largest Retirement Plans," average asset mixes are highlighted. Corporate defined benefit plans have 25.6% in domestic fixed-income, public defined benefit plans have 23.3% in domestic fixed-income, and union defined benefit plans have 23.9% in domestic fixed-income.
2 A domestic fixed-income firm is an asset management firm that has fixed-income products. It does not mean that the firm is exclusively fixed-income. 3 An example would be a firm that lists intermediate government/credit as core fixed-income. Also, for firms that have multiple products listed within the same strategy (core or high-yield), we researched the products and included the one that was most consistent with the index. Firms include multiple products in the same strategy, because the way the
